Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events in emerging economies by Matheson, Victor
College of the Holy Cross
CrossWorks
Economics Department Working Papers Economics Department
9-1-2012
Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events
in emerging economies
Victor Matheson
College of the Holy Cross, vmatheso@holycross.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Papers by an authorized administrator of CrossWorks.
Recommended Citation
Matheson, Victor, "Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events in emerging economies" (2012). Economics Department Working
Papers. Paper 8.
http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers/8
 Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events in 
emerging economies 
 
 
 
By 
 
Victor A. Matheson 
 
 
 
September 2012 
 
 
 
 COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
FACULTY RESEARCH SERIES, PAPER NO. 12-03
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
College of the Holy Cross 
Box 45A 
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 
(508) 793-3362 (phone) 
(508) 793-3708 (fax) 
 
http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website 
 
 
*
All papers in the Holy Cross Working Paper Series should be considered draft versions 
subject to future revision. Comments and suggestions are welcome. 
 
  
 
Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events in 
emerging economies 
 
 
 
Victor A. Matheson 
College of the Holy Cross
1
 
                    
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Developing countries that host mega-events such as the Olympic Games and 
World Cup invest enormous sums in stadiums and collateral infrastructure projects. The 
rapid investment in long-lasting physical stocks raises questions of equity and efficiency 
for national taxpayers and event attendees. This paper reviews several cases of historical 
and recent  mega-events to assess the infrastructure costs, returns on infrastructure 
investments, and impacts of the events on urban development patterns. It will highlight 
cases where mega-event investments contributed to long-term economic growth. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 Sporting mega-events such as the Summer and Winter Olympic Games or 
soccer’s World Cup focus the world’s attention on the region hosting the event and are 
highly sought-after prizes. Indeed, the competition among cities and countries to host 
these events is often as fierce as the competition on the playing field. Increasingly, 
developing countries have thrown their names into the bidding process in an attempt to 
chase after the riches and the glory that, presumably, accrue to the city where the games 
will take place. However, with great events come great responsibilities, and the cost of 
operating, organizing, and building infrastructure for an Olympic Games or World Cup 
can be daunting. From an economic stand point, the question is whether mega-events 
represent a good investment for developing countries, and it is this question that will be 
addressed in this chapter.  
 The modern Summer Olympic Games began in 1896 and take place every four 
years at new locations selected through an elaborate bidding process many years in 
advance of the event. The Winter Olympics, held since 1924, follow an identical 
procedure. In recent times, the host city for both the Summer and Winter Games has been 
selected six or seven years before the event is to take place. Historically, hosting the 
Olympic Games has been almost exclusively the domain of rich, industrialized nations. 
Between 1896 and 1952, every Summer and Winter Games was held in either Western 
Europe or the U.S. with cities in Japan, Canada, and Australia joining the mix over the 
next two decades (as shown in Table 1). Mexico City in 1968 was the first location 
outside the industrialized world in which the Games were held. Eastern European 
countries were awarded the Summer Games in 1980 (Moscow) and Winter Games in 
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1984 (Sarajevo, Yugoslavia). Seoul, Korea was awarded the 1988 Summer Games, a time 
during which South Korea might be classified as “rapidly industrializing” rather than 
industrialized, but it is probably fair to note that shortly after the Olympics, the country 
was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
a sort of de facto dividing line between industrialized and developing nations.  
 More recently, however, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has 
encouraged bids from poorer countries and has awarded the Games on several occasions 
to non-traditional countries outside of the OECD. The 2008 Summer Games were hosted 
by China, and the 2016 Summer Olympics will be played in Rio de Janeiro, the first time 
the event has taken place in the South America, while the 2014 Winter Olympics will 
take place in Sochi, Russia, leaving Western Europe, North America, and Japan, for only 
the second time. As seen in Table 2, the list of countries submitting formal bids has also 
dramatically changed in recent decades. Twenty percent of the bids submitted for the 
Summer Games prior to 2000 came from outside of Western Europe, Japan, Australia, 
Canada, and the US.  Since 2000, however, over half of all bids have come from this 
group including applications by Istanbul, Bangkok, Havana, Buenos Aires, and Cape 
Town, among others, plus, of course, the successful bids by Beijing and Rio. On the 
Winter Olympics side, the past decade has witnessed bids from Kazakhstan, Georgia, 
China, Slovakia, and Poland for the first time.   
 The world’s other major international mega-sporting event is the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. Like the Olympics, this event 
takes place every four years and features soccer teams composed of players grouped by 
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nationality ( i.e. “national teams”). The World Cup2 began in 1930 in response to soccer’s 
growing prominence in the Olympics. Due to the number of large stadiums required to 
accommodate the tournament, FIFA selects a host country for the event as opposed to the 
IOC’s tradition of choosing a single host city. As again shown in Table 1, for the first 60 
years of the competition, the World Cup essentially alternated between the two centers of 
soccer interest, Europe and Latin America, so unlike the Olympics, numerous countries 
in Central and South America have hosted the World Cup including Uruguay, Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.  
This rotation scheme lasted until 1994 when FIFA, in an attempt to expand world 
interest in the game, awarded the World Cup to the US, a huge untapped market for the 
sport. Japan and South Korea followed in 2002, the first tournament co-hosted by two 
countries and the first World Cup played in Asia. More “firsts” followed in the wake of 
the US, Japan, and South Korea. South Africa became the first African host in 2010, 
Russia becomes the first Eastern European host in 2018, and Qatar, a nation with no 
domestic soccer league and little soccer history or tradition, will become the first Middle 
Eastern host in 2022. In 2014, the World Cup returns to a Latin American country for the 
first time in nearly 30 years when Brazil will host the event. 
It is interesting to note that economically, the world’s attention has increasingly 
shifted from the so-called G-7 nations, which include the world’s largest industrialized 
economies such as the US, Japan, UK, and Germany, to the BRICS nations, an acronym 
for the five rapidly developing nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
                                                         
2
 Other international sporting organizations, notably in Cricket and Rugby, also host similar international 
tournaments that are dubbed “the World Cup.” These events are typically smaller than the FIFA World 
Cup, and for the purposes of this paper, the term “World Cup” is meant to describe the soccer tournament 
unless specifically noted otherwise. 
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When one includes the 2010 Commonwealth Games hosted by India, on the world’s 
sports stage, each of these countries will have held at least one of the world’s top sporting 
events between 2008 and 2018. 
 The shift to a more egalitarian system of awarding mega-events to non-traditional 
hosts has it proponents. Supporters of South Africa’s failed bid to host the 2006 World 
Cup were bitterly disappointed with the controversial decision that instead designated 
Germany as the host nation. With the growing interest in soccer throughout Africa, it was 
thought that the continent deserved its own chance to host the tournament. However, an 
in-depth analysis of both the short-run and long-run economic impact of hosting mega-
events demonstrates that in a direct economic sense, the World Cup is more of a poisoned 
chalice. Similarly, the Olympics often prove to be an expensive burden providing a short-
run economic boost well below what the event’s proponents typically predict and few 
long-run economic benefits. 
 
Short-run costs and benefits 
 It is undeniable that mega-events result in significant tourism expenditures, but in 
the vast majority of cases the observed increases in economic activity fall well short of 
the economic impact predicted by event organizers. Focusing just on the Olympics and 
World Cup, Table 3 shows commissioned ex ante economic impact studies for various 
Olympics and World Cups.  Table 4 shows ex post estimates of economic impact 
performed by economists not associated with the events for various Olympics and World 
Cups examining actual economic data before, during, and after the events. In the majority 
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of cases, independent economists find little or no direct economic impact of mega-events 
on host economies. 
 The disconnect between ex ante predictions and ex post reality comes as a result 
of numerous factors. As numerous authors including Matheson (2008), economic impact 
studies may be based on inflated, unrealistic, or best-case predictions, but even when 
appropriate data are used, many economic impact estimates regularly suffer from several 
features that serve to exaggerate the numbers. First, to the extent a sporting event attracts 
spectators from the local community, any money spent by these fans is money not being 
spent by these residents elsewhere in the local economy. Spending by local citizens does 
not represent new money in the economy but is rather simply money that is reallocated 
within the city or country. While crowds of local fans filling up the stadiums cheering for 
the home team makes for a festive atmosphere, it does little to encourage new spending in 
the economy or promote economic growth. 
Second, money spent in a local economy during a mega-event may not stick in the 
local economy. Mega-events are frequently characterized by capacity constraints and 
high prices for items such as accommodations. Hotel rooms can frequently sell at three or 
four time their normal rates during mega-events, but the desk clerks and room cleaners 
who service these establishments will not generally see their wages triple or quadruple. 
Thus, the tourist industry should see an increase in returns to capital, and to the extent 
hotels or other service industries are owned by individuals outside the local economy, 
spending at the event leaks out of the host economy. 
Third, sports fans can crowd out regular visitors displacing economic activity that 
would have occurred in the absence of the sporting event. While a city’s hotels and 
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restaurants may be full of sports fans during a tournament, if those same hotel rooms and 
restaurants would have been full of business travelers or other vacationers in the absence 
of the mega-event, then the tournament has not resulted in a net increase in economic 
activity. Yogi Berra’s famous quote, “no one goes there anymore, it’s too crowded,” 
while nonsensical on the surface, has a strong element of truth to it when applied to 
tourism and mega-events.   
 An examination of tourist arrivals in South Africa around the time of the 2010 
World Cup is illustrative of these issues. The 64 games of the tournament attracted an 
average of 49,670 spectators per match for a total of nearly 3.2 million fans. As noted 
previously, only foreign visitors should be included in any economic impact estimates 
and many fans are likely to attend more than one game, so the number of persons that 
should be included in any impact figures is likely to be significantly below 3.2 million. 
The consulting firm Grant Thornton South Africa initially predicted 483,000 international 
visitors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, later revising their figures 
downward to 373,000 international visitors. Even this number turned out to be too 
optimistic, as FIFA reported that just “309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa for 
the primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup” and that they spent 3.64 
billion rand during their stay (FIFA, 2010). Thus, the substitution effect combined with 
overly rosy attendance figures reduced 3.2 million fans in the stadiums to just 310 
thousand actual overseas visitors.  
 The bad news for South Africa does not stop there. Total tourist arrivals in June 
and July 2010 were only 273 thousand above the same months the year before suggesting 
a degree of crowding out. Furthermore, 2009 was a particular poor year for tourism to 
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South Africa due to the worldwide economic crisis. Econometric analysis of tourist 
arrivals suggests an increase of only 123 to 202 thousand above what would have been 
expected with the World Cup. (Matheson, Peeters, and Syzmanski, 2012). These visitor 
numbers are unlikely to be sufficient to cover the high costs of putting on a mega-event 
of this magnitude. South Africa’s experience is far from unique. Beijing reported total 
visitor numbers in August 2008 during the Summer Olympics similar to those in the same 
month during the previous year, and shops, restaurants and tourist attractions outside of 
the areas immediately adjacent to the Olympic venues in London reported a tourist 
drought during the 2012 Summer Games (CBC, 2012). 
 
Short-run costs 
Hosting mega-events can be an enormously expensive affair and governing bodies 
such as the IOC and FIFA typically require that the majority of the costs be borne by the 
host country. The Olympics require a large amount of very specific sports infrastructure 
in order to accommodate the range of events. For the World Cup, FIFA requires host 
countries to have at least 12 modern stadiums capable of seating at least 40,000 
spectators with one of the stadiums being able to seat at least 80,000 for the opener and 
the final. Operating costs can often entail heavy expenditures in large part due to the 
extensive security requirements that mega-events require. The security budget alone for 
the Athens Olympics of 2004 ran to over $1.5 billion, nearly 6 times the budget for the 
Sydney Games just 4 years earlier. The 2010 FIFA World Cup entailed $3.9 billion in 
expenses borne by South Africa, including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction 
costs (Voigt, 2010; Baade and Matheson, 2012). Costs for Brazil’s 2014 World Cup are 
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currently unknown but somewhere well in excess of $10 billion. As is common in 
sporting events, costs have escalated drastically in just a few short years.  
“Back in 2009, the Brazilian Football Confederation estimated the 12 stadiums 
being refitted or built for the World Cup would cost about 2.2 billion reais – a 
figure that two years later seems quaint. The government now sees them costing 
more than triple that, at 6.9 billion reais.” (Grudgings, 2011) 
 
 Table 4 shows the sports infrastructure, non-sports infrastructure, and operational 
spending for various recent mega-events. Full information is not available for all events. 
Sports infrastructure includes spending on stadiums and sports venues while non-sport 
infrastructure includes construction costs for transportation, tourist and athlete 
accommodations, and public spaces. It is important to note that the dividing line between 
sports infrastructure and non-sports infrastructure is not entirely clear. For example, 20% 
of the total budgeted cost for London’s new Wembley Stadium was $150 million in 
general infrastructure improvements including a new roads and a renovated Underground 
station designed to better accommodate stadium traffic. While the roads and subway 
station are clearly not a part of the stadium, without the stadium, the roads and station 
would not be required. (Matheson, 2008)  It is also worth noting that the entire Wembley 
project, which will play a significant role in the 2012 London Summer Games, ended up 
costing 798 million pounds (2007) over twice its original budget, yet another example of 
optimistic accounting in sporting events. 
 Given the huge costs associated with mega-events and the relatively small number 
of visitors, it is virtually impossible for the direct revenues associated with these events to 
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cover their expenses. This is less true if little in the way of new infrastructure needs to be 
built. For example, total infrastructure costs for the 1994 World Cup held in the US were 
only $30 million as the existing stadiums in the country were more than adequate for the 
event. Similarly, the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles made a large profit for the 
organizers, again because existing facilities were used for most events. Given the huge 
increases in security that have arisen in the post 9/11 world, however, it is uncertain that 
even with no capital outlays that a mega-event would have short-run net benefits for the 
host. Thus, economic rationality rests on the legacy effects of the events in terms of 
branding or economic growth based on infrastructure legacies.  
 
Long-run benefits 
 While the short-run tourism boost that mega-events provide are clearly limited 
especially in relation to the large expenses involved, typically event organizers claim that 
mega-events result in a lasting legacy that will provide significant economic benefits for 
many years to come. Just as the short-run benefits of mega-events are overblown, so too 
are the claims of long-run benefits from sports infrastructure. 
 It is often claimed that stadiums and sports facilities can serve as an anchor to 
promote local economic development. Supporters envision stadiums serving as an 
integrated component of a thriving and diverse local economy. One example of this 
economic model is the Wrigleyville neighborhood on the north side of Chicago, home to 
Major League Baseball’s Chicago Cubs. Wrigley Field, the second oldest major league 
sports stadium in the US behind only Boston’s venerable Fenway Park, was built in 1914 
and rests comfortably within the existing street grid. The Cubs generate significant 
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spillover effects for the surrounding community by attracting sports fans to area. The 81-
game season brings into the local neighborhood roughly 3 million baseball fans who 
frequent bars, restaurants, and souvenir shops both before and after home games. Figure 1 
clearly shows how the Wrigley Field serves to promote local businesses. A thriving 
entertainment district has grown up around the stadium, and dozens of eating and 
drinking establishments can be seen within just a few blocks of the Cubs’ home. 
 Unfortunately for proponents of sports-based economic development, Wrigley 
Field is the exception rather than the rule. Just 10 miles south of Wrigley is US Cellular 
Park, home of the Chicago White Sox, Chicago’s other Major League Baseball team. 
Built in 1992 to replace the aging Comisky Park, US Cellular is more in line with most 
modern stadiums that are designed to maximize in-stadium revenue. As exemplified by 
US Cellular Park (shown in Figure 2), in many cases the modern stadium is best seen as a 
walled fortress with a moat of parking lots driving fans inside the castle and away from 
the barbarian hoards of shops and businesses in the local neighborhood. Indeed, the 
overwhelming evidence from economists studying the economic benefits of new 
stadiums on local economies have found little or no positive impact on metropolitan area 
economies (Coates and Humphreys, 1999; 2008; Baade, 1996), although neighborhood 
effects are evident in some cases (Tu 2005; Feng and Humphreys, 2008). 
 Most studies of stadium economics have examined facilities in the US and to a 
lesser extent in Europe, but if the economics are poor for facilities in the industrialized 
world, their prospects are even worse in developing countries. Rich countries usually 
have well-developed professional sports leagues meaning that in many cases existing 
sports infrastructure can be utilized, and many new facilities can find productive uses 
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after the event. For example, currently all 12 of the stadiums used in Germany in the 
2006 World Cup are regularly filled to capacity by the Bundesliga soccer teams that have 
become full-time tenants. In contrast, the South African Premier Soccer League averages 
only 7,500 fans per match, hardly the crowds for which the World Cup stadiums were 
designed. Other events at South African stadiums have rarely filled the venues. Atlanta’s 
newly constructed Centennial Olympic Stadium was renovated after the 1996 Games and 
is currently home to Major League Baseball’s Atlanta Braves while the Beijing National 
Stadium (better known as the “Bird’s Nest”) sits largely unused.  
Without regular, well-attended events at the newly constructed sports facilities, 
the stadiums are unlikely to give rise to urban development in their local neighborhoods. 
Indeed, an overhead image (Figure 3) of the area in Beijing around the Bird’s Nest and 
the National Aquatic Center (or “Water Cube”) shows a beautifully landscaped area but 
little in the way of automobile or pedestrian traffic and few new businesses. Similarly, a 
view of Soccer City (Figure 4) on the outskirts of Johannesburg, South Africa, the site of 
the 2010 World Cup Final, shows a string of administrative buildings next to the stadium 
but little else. For the most part, new stadiums in developing countries mirror the 
experience of Chicago’s US Cellular Park not the more development friendly Wrigley 
Field.    
 Sports facilities are generally quite difficult to convert to other uses. Housing for 
athletes or officials can be easily converted to residential facilities for students or other 
residents as was done in Atlanta following the 1996 Summer Olympics and in Los 
Angeles in 1984. Such conversions are rare, however, for athletic venues. The famous 
“Water Cube” in Beijing, home of most of the aquatic events in the 2008 Summer 
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Games, was opened for public swimming in the year after the Olympics making it the 
world’s most expensive lap pool. It subsequently underwent significant renovations and 
reopened as a large water park. While that is fine long-term use for an otherwise 
underutilized venue, it is also an extraordinarily expensive way to build a water park.  
 If the creation of new or improved sports infrastructure cannot be seen as a savior 
for mega-events, then one is left to appeal to the creation of non-sports infrastructure as 
an economic justification for hosting mega-events. As can be seen in Table 4, non-sports 
related infrastructure expenditures often exceed the spending on sports venues by a wide 
margin, and unlike sports venues, expenditures on transportation networks and other 
types of general infrastructure have the potential to encourage future growth. Mega-
events can serve as an impetus to engage in needed infrastructure investments that don’t 
get done due to a lack of political will. Brazil, for example, is engaging in massive 
investment spending in its run up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. 
The words of Brazilian Football Confederation President Ricardo Teixeira echo those of 
many proponents of mega-events.   
"We are a civilized nation, a nation that is going through an excellent 
phase, and we have got everything prepared to receive adequately the 
honor to organize an excellent World Cup. Over the next few years we 
will have a consistent influx of investments. The 2014 World Cup will 
enable Brazil to have a modern infrastructure. In social terms it will be 
very beneficial.… Our objective is to make Brazil become more visible in 
global arenas. The World Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It’s 
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going to be an interesting tool to promote social transformation.” (CNN, 
2007) 
 
There is an element of truth to Teixeira’s words; however, two caveats are 
in order. First, spending millions or billions of dollars in unproductive sports 
infrastructure simply in order to have the political will to make needed 
infrastructure investments is a distinctly second-best economic strategy. Public 
capital would be more efficiently allocated if governments would simply make 
reasonable public investment choices without a mega-event hanging over their 
heads. In addition, mega-events can place surprising tight deadlines on major 
public works projects. These deadlines can serve to raise costs due to rushed 
schedules, relaxed bidding rules, and potential corruption. Finally, it should be 
noted that preparations for a mega-event can result in too high a level of 
investment in non-athletic infrastructure. An airport, transportation network, or 
number of hotel rooms that is the right size for three weeks of tourist insanity may 
be extensively overbuilt for the post-event period. For example, two major luxury 
hotels built for the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, filed for 
bankruptcy shortly after the close of the Games.  
The final potential benefit of mega-events is that they can serve to “put the 
host on the map” leading to higher levels of future tourism, trade, and investment. 
As noted by Matheson (2008), 
The other major intangible benefit of mega-events claimed by 
sports boosters is that of national and international exposure. Sports fans 
16 
 
may enjoy their visit to the city and return later raising future tourist 
revenues for the area. Corporate visitors, it is claimed, may relocate 
manufacturing facilities and company headquarters to the city. Television 
viewers might decide to take a trip to the host city at some time in the 
future based on what they see during the broadcast of the mega-event. 
Finally, hosting a major event might raise perceptions of the city so that it 
becomes a “world class” city and travel destination. All of these claims are 
potential true although little empirical research has conclusively 
demonstrated any long-run connections between hosting mega-events and 
future tourism demand. There are not even any anecdotal examples of 
companies moving corporate operations to a city based on the hosting of a 
sporting event. 
 
There are individual cases where mega-events do seem to have major 
influence on future demand, but it appears that a “perfect storm” is needed. Cities 
that are already on everyone’s map, London for example, gain little in exposure 
from a major event since they are already at nearly maximum exposure. Other 
cities such as Atlanta or many Winter Olympics hosts also gain little from 
exposure because the cities have little to offer potential tourists. Advertising 
without a subject to advertise is largely ineffective. In a perfect situation, a 
“hidden gem” can raise its international profile with the right situation. This 
appears to have been the case with Barcelona, a city with great artistic, cultural, 
and architectural treasures, but also a city long overshadowed by European 
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capitals such as Madrid, Rome, London, and Paris, as well as 40 years of fascist 
rule. By 2012, twenty years after their moment on the world stage, Barcelona was 
the fourth most visited city in Europe. Barcelona’s tourism experience, however, 
has not been replicated in the majority of Olympic hosts.  
Rose and Spiegel (2010) find that international trade increases 
significantly when a country hosts a major event. Typically, this would lend 
strong evidence to the idea that the Olympics or World Cup has a large 
advertising effect, but the authors also find that simply the act of bidding for the 
Olympics serves to increase capital inflows. They chalk this up to a signaling 
effect that bidding for the Olympics lets other countries know that the nation is 
“open for business.” If Rose and Spiegel’s finding are truly more than spurious 
correlation, the findings of other economists suggest that an optimal strategy 
would be bid for the Olympics but not win them. Subsequent analysis of foreign 
trade flow, however, indeed suggests that Rose and Spiegel’s findings are likely 
the result of selection bias. Countries that are in the position to bid for the 
Olympics are typically the sort of rich, growing countries that generally 
experience trade growth. When Olympic hosts and bidders are compared to 
otherwise similar countries that did not bid for the Games, the so-called “Olympic 
Effect” disappears (Maennig and Richter, 2012).     
It should also be noted that the presence of a mega-event may bring with it 
intangible costs as well as benefits. For example, the publicity associated with a 
sporting event may not always place a city in a positive light. The bribery scandal 
that surrounded the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City certainly didn’t 
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enhance the city’s reputation. Similarly, the international reputations of Munich 
and Atlanta were tarnished by the terrorist events that occurred during the 
Olympic Games held in their respective cities.  
Of course, the use of sporting events to provide entertainment for the masses has 
been around for centuries. The term “bread and circuses” dates from the first century 
Roman empire where extravagant games were held in conjunction with giveaways of 
subsidized food in order to pacify the citizenry and reduce urban unrest. Sports boosters 
also often cite civic pride or national exposure as a primary benefit of mega-events and of 
sports in general. In many cases, it is undoubtedly true that mega-events bring intangible 
psychological value to the communities that host them. The 1995 Rugby World Cup in 
South Africa represented an opportunity for the country to announce its re-emergence as 
a full member of not only the world’s sporting community but also its political 
community. The picture of South African President Nelson Mandela wearing the jersey 
of the white South African captain Francois Pienaar while presenting him with the 
championship trophy was a powerful image to the world indicating that South Africa had 
emerged from its years of racial oppression and served to unify the country (Baade and 
Matheson, 2004a). Similarly, Ray Nagin, the mayor of New Orleans, pointed to the return 
of the NFL to the city in September 2006 as an important symbol to the rest of the 
country that the city was fully on the road to recovery from Hurricane Katrina which had 
devastated the city the year previously. Allmers and Maennig (2009) also found that the 
largest identifiable effect from the 2006 World Cup in Germany was a clear increase in 
self-reported happiness among German residents, a “feel-good” effect.  
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Conclusion 
 Empirical research into the true economic impact of mega-events on host 
economies tends to show that major sporting events bring high costs with low rewards. 
The return to mega-events in developing nations may be even lower. Probably the best 
that can be said for mega-events is that they allow governments to overcome political 
constraints to allow beneficial infrastructure investments to be made. However, 
overcoming these political constraints comes at a very high cost in terms of money spent 
on unproductive investments in sport infrastructure and tournament operations, and there 
is also no guarantee that any all general infrastructure investments will provide a net 
positive return for the cities involved.  
While the recent trend has been to “reward” developing countries with the 
opportunity to host mega-events such as the World Cup and the Olympics, the empirical 
evidence suggests that if rich countries want to promote economic development in poor 
countries, it would make more sense for high-income nations to explicitly keep these 
events out of the developing world and instead continue to award the games to rich 
countries that are better able to absorb more of the associated costs than low-income 
countries. Alternatively, the industrialized world could subsidize these events when they 
are held in poor countries through sponsorship or by direct foreign assistance although 
seems unlikely that rich countries would be willing to subsidize poor countries’ hosting 
efforts when the two are often in direct competition with one another for the rights to host 
in the first place.  
It remains a widespread belief among countries that there are substantial national 
gains to be made from hosting these global events, but the evidence indicates that this is 
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rarely the case.  Samuel Johnson once wrote that second marriages reflect “the triumph of 
hope over experience.” Such thinking also pervades the vigorous competition among 
countries to host these exciting but economically questionable events.
21 
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Figure 1: Wrigley Field 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baade, Matheson, and Nikolova (2007). Reprinted courtesy of 
Geographische Rundschau International Edition.
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Figure 2:  US Cellular Park 
 
 
 
Source: Baade, Matheson, and Nikolova (2007). Reprinted courtesy of Geographische 
Rundschau International Edition. 
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Figure 3:  “Bird’s Nest,” “Water Cube,” and Olympics Sports Center in Beijing 
 
Image source:  Astrium GEO-Information Services 
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Figure 4:  “Soccer City” near Johannesburg 
 
Image source:  Astrium GEO-Information Services 
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Table 1: Hosts of the Summer and Winter Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup 
Year Summer Olympics Winter Olympics World Cup 
1896 Athens Not held  
1900 Paris Not held  
1904 St. Louis, USA Not held  
1908 London Not held  
1912 Stockholm Not held  
1916 Not held Not held  
1920 Antwerp Not held  
1924 Paris Chamonix, France  
1928 Amsterdam St. Moritz, Switzerland  
1930   Uruguay 
1932 Los Angeles Lake Placid, USA  
1934   Italy 
1936 Berlin, Germany Garmisch, Germany  
1938   France 
1940 Not held Not held  
1942   Not held 
1944 Not held Not held  
1946   Not held 
1948 London St. Moritz, Switzerland  
1950   Brazil 
1952 Helsinki Olso, Norway  
1954   Switzerland 
1956 Melbourne Cortina, Italy  
1958   Sweden 
1960 Rome Squaw Valley, USA  
1962   Chile 
1964 Tokyo Innsbruck, Austria  
1966   England 
1968 Mexico City Grenoble, France  
1970   Mexico 
1972 Munich Sapporo, Japan  
1974   Germany 
1976 Montreal Innsbruck, Austria  
1978   Argentina 
1980 Moscow Lake Placid, USA  
1982   Spain 
1984 Los Angeles Sarajevo, Yugoslavia  
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1986   Mexico 
1988 Seoul Calgary, Canada  
1990   Italy 
1992 Barcelona Albertville, France  
1994  Lillehammer, Norway USA 
1996 Atlanta   
1998  Nagano, Japan France 
2000 Sydney   
2002  Salt Lake City, USA South Korea/Japan 
2004 Athens   
2006  Turin, Italy Germany 
2008 Beijing   
2010  Vancouver, Canada South Africa 
2012 London   
2014  Sochi, Russia Brazil 
2016 Rio de Janiero   
2018   Russia 
2022   Qatar 
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Table 2: Summer and Winter Olympic Games bids 
Event Bids from 
industrialized 
countries 
Bids from 
developing 
countries 
Bids from Eastern 
Bloc or former 
Soviet states 
Summer Olympics: 
1896-1996 
71 (82%) 9 (10%) 7 (8%) 
Summer Olympics: 
2000-2016  
21 (49%) 19 (44%) 3 (7%) 
Winter Olympics: 
1924-1998  
51 (93%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 
Winter Olympics: 
2002-2014  
18 (56%) 3 (9%) 11 (34%) 
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Table 3: Examples of Mega-Event ex ante Economic Impact Studies 
 
Event Year Impact Source 
World Cup (Japan) 2002 $24.8 billion 
Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, 
Finer (2002) 
World Cup (South Korea) 2002 $8.9 billion 
Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, 
Finer (2002) 
World Cup (South Africa) 2010 
$7.5 billion 
198,400 jobs 
Grant Thornton SA, Rihlamvu (2011) 
World Cup (South Africa) 2010 
$12 billion 
483,000 visitors 
Grant Thornton SA, Voigt (2010) 
Summer Olympics (Atlanta) 1996 
$5.1 billion 
77,000 jobs 
Humphreys and Plummer (2005) 
Winter Olympics (Vancouver, BC) 2010 
$10.7C billion 
244,000 jobs 
InterVISTAS Consulting (2002) 
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Table 4 Examples of Mega-Event ex post Economic Impact Studies 
 
Event Years Variable Impact Source 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996 Employment 3,500 - 42,000 jobs 
Baade and Matheson 
(2002) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996 Employment Approx. 75,000 
Feddersen and Maennig 
(2012) 
Winter Olympics 2002 Employment 
 
Baumann, Engelhardt, 
and Matheson (2012a) 
Winter Olympics 2002 Retail Sales 
Positive, hotels 
Negative, retailers 
Baade, Baumann and 
Matheson (2010) 
World Cup 1994 Employment 
 
Baumann, Engelhardt, 
and Matheson  (2012b) 
World Cup 2006 Employment 
Not statistically 
significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
World Cup 1994 Personal Income down $4 billion 
Baade and Matheson 
(2004) 
World Cup 2006 Personal Income 
Not statistically 
significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
World Cup 2006 Employment 
Not statistically 
significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
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Table 5: Costs of Hosting Mega-Events 
 
Event 
Years 
Type Spending  
(millions, $’11) 
Source 
Summer Olympics 
(Seoul) 
1988  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$2,856 
$4,870 
Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Barcelona) 
1992  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$1,731 
$14,517 
Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 
1996  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$798 
$999 
Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Sydney) 
2000  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$1,672 
$1,725 
Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Athens) 
2004  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
Operations 
$13,813 Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Beijing) 
2008  
Sports Infrastructure 
Total Spending (est.) 
$1,758 
$45,000 
Preuss (2008) 
Baade and Matheson 
(2012) 
Summer Olympics 
(London) 
2012 Total Cost $15,000 - $20,000   Burns (2012) 
Winter Olympics 
(Nagano) 
1998 Total Cost Over $14,000 Longman (1998) 
Winter Olympics 
(Turin) 
2006 Total Cost $4,100 Payne (2008) 
Winter Olympics 
(Vancouver) 
2010 Total Cost C$5,900 Economist (2011) 
Winter Olympics 
(Sochi, Russia) 
2014 
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
Operations 
$10,000 
(estimated) 
Estimates, very 
preliminary 
World Cup (Japan 
/South Korea) 
2002 Sports Infrastructure 
$2,000 (S. Korea) 
$4,000-$5,600 
(Japan) 
Sloan (2002) 
 
World Cup 
(Germany) 
2006 Sports Infrastructure $1,870 Downie (2012) 
World Cup (South 
Africa) 
2010 
Sports Infrastructure 
Total 
$1,300 
$3,900 
(Voigt, 2010; Baade 
and Matheson, 2011).   
World Cup (Brazil) 2014 
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$3,680 
$13,000 (est.) 
Downie (2012) 
World Cup 
(Russia) 
2018 Total $10,000 (est.) 
Estimates, very 
preliminary 
World Cup (Japan 
/South Korea) 
2002 Sports Infrastructure 
$2,000 (S. Korea) 
$4-$5,600 (Japan) 
(Sloan, 2002) 
 
 
